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Introduction 
Owen Barfield (1898-1997) was a thinker, literary scholar, writer, solicitor, 
and an eminent interpreter of Rudolf Steiner‟s spiritual philosophy, known as 
Anthroposophy. He studied at Oxford University and was a member of the 
literary group, the Inklings, which included J. R. R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis. 
After publishing a number of works, including History in English Words 
(1926) and Poetic Diction (1928), Barfield worked as a solicitor for twenty-
eight years but continued to write during this period. In 1957 Saving the 
Appearances was published, and after retiring as a solicitor in 1959, Barfield 
taught as a visiting professor at a number of universities in the United States. 
He wrote many more articles and books, among them, Worlds Apart (1963), 
Speaker’s Meaning (1967), and What Coleridge Thought (1971). Barfield‟s 
theoretical writings on the subjects of poetic imagination, the evolution of 
consciousness and semantic history, British Romanticism (especially 
Coleridge) and Anthroposophy have been highly regarded by numerous writers 
and academics such as the American Poet Laureate Howard Nemerov, the 
Nobel Prize winning novelist, Saul Bellow, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, the 
French Christian Existentialist Gabriel Marcel, and C. S. Lewis, who referred 
to Barfield as the “best and wisest of my unofficial teachers.”
1
 
In this article I will discuss key ideas in Barfield‟s conception of the 
poetic imagination and illustrate some of the debts that his work owes to 
Rudolf Steiner‟s philosophy and Anthroposophy. Two of the most significant 
texts in which Barfield discusses the theme of poetic imagination and poetic 
language are Poetic Diction and Saving the Appearances. Barfield‟s view of 
imagination in these and other works is inseparable from his conception of the 
evolution of consciousness, especially in so far as it is manifest in semantic 
history. „Imagination‟ and the „evolution of consciousness‟ are two of the most 
central expressions in Barfield‟s entire philosophy. For these reasons my 
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treatment of imagination will necessarily include a consideration of Barfield‟s 
understanding of the evolution of consciousness.  
I have chosen to focus on Barfield and Steiner‟s view of the creative 
imagination as they attribute a much deeper epistemic and ontological 
significance to poetry than is typical today. They argue that imagination can be 
developed into an organ of knowledge or a kind of gnosis that transcends 
ordinary intellectual consciousness.
2
 This is far from the widespread equation 
of imagination with subjective fancy and the related view of poetry and art as 
arenas for personal self-expression. Barfield and Steiner‟s elevated view of 
imagination is continuous with the conception of imagination held by great 
poets and thinkers of the Romantic era, such as Coleridge and Goethe. Their 
understanding of imagination also finds predecessors in the Christian esoteric 
tradition via figures such as Paracelsus and Jakob Boehme, and in Sufism as 
discussed by Henry Corbin.
3
  
In the first section of this article I outline Steiner‟s understanding of 
thinking and imagination. In the subsequent section I sketch Steiner‟s view of 
the evolution of consciousness. The third, lengthiest section is devoted to 
elaborating Barfield‟s conception of the poetic imagination so as to indicate his 
debt to Steiner. I conclude with some remarks on the importance of Steiner and 
Barfield‟s conception of imagination for our understanding of poetry.  
 
Steiner’s Conception of Imagination  
In chapter three of The Philosophy of Freedom (Die Philosophie der Freiheit) 
– Steiner‟s major work prior to lecturing within the context of the 
Theosophical and later the Anthroposophical Society
4
 – observation and 
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thinking are identified as the two central components of human mental life.
5
 
Observation for Steiner refers to all content that is passively given to 
consciousness. While observation ultimately presupposes thinking (Steiner 
here anticipates Husserl‟s conception of the role of intentionality in all 
conscious experience) and we would never grasp the full nature of reality 
without the contribution that our thinking makes to the picture of the world, 
thinking itself ordinarily remains unobserved, and for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, it is a characteristic of thinking to give itself over to its object and to 
forget itself in the process. Secondly, observation involves passivity, but 
thinking only occurs through independent activity. Only an object can be given 
to ordinary observation, whereas thinking is an act rather than an object. As I 
am intimately involved in thinking I cannot detach myself from my thinking 
such that it stands before me as an object. Thirdly, it is characteristic of 
ordinary thinking that I am only aware of its results, namely thoughts, and not 
of thinking as such.  
In spite of these factors, Steiner calls the reader to bring about an extra-
ordinary state of mind and to observe his or her thinking. In chapter three of 
The Philosophy of Freedom Steiner claims that we can only observe thinking 
after it has been actively generated, but through this extraordinary act we 
nevertheless achieve a qualitative identity between the observer and the 
observed; thinking grasps itself.
6
 The thinker thereby becomes aware of 
thinking as a self-sustaining spiritual reality; a self-grounding ground. 
Thinking also transcends the subject-object distinction, as it is thinking that 
determines the content of subject and object and sets them in contradistinction 
to one another.
7
 Moreover, in the activity of thinking we are united with the 
divine, or to be more specific, “we are the all-one being that pervades 
everything.”
8
 While thinking can only occur through my independent activity, 
the essence of thinking is universal. Steiner‟s view of thinking in The 
Philosophy of Freedom recalls earlier Thomist and Aristotelian ideas about the 
divine nature and universality of the active intellect or nous.
9
 However, 
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Steiner‟s philosophy involves an individualism that is not present in classical 
philosophy. This is evident in his philosophical method that calls the reader to 
reflect on his or her own mental activity, and is especially clear in the moral 
part of The Philosophy of Freedom where Steiner vouches for a position that he 
calls “ethical individualism.”
10
 Steiner characterised his philosophy as a 
synthesis of Fichte and Aristotle and there are many connections in his work to 
both of these thinkers.
11
 With respect to the theme of thinking, it can be said 
that Steiner unites a modern Fichtean emphasis on the self with an Aristotelian 
sense of the universality of thinking.
12
  
This foundational significance of thinking is maintained in all of 
Steiner‟s writings. Moreover, Steiner was of the view that the power of 
thinking can be transformed and that there are no absolute limits to knowledge. 
In Goethe‟s scientific studies, Steiner already found evidence for the possibility 
of enlivening the processes of thinking and perception in order to gain deeper 
insight into the living processes of nature.
13
 In his anthroposophical works 
Steiner outlines numerous spiritual exercises, with the goal of enabling a 
deeper insight into reality. These exercises include: thought-concentration, 
meditation on sacred texts and symbols, and attentive observation of nature. 
Steiner claims that through carrying out such exercises and developing 
ourselves morally, our cognitive powers can be transformed. He outlines three 
levels of consciousness above that of intellectual thought and sense perception, 
which he calls: Imagination, Inspiration, and Intuition.
14
 Each of these 
                                                                                                                          
Mildred Robertson Nicoll (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956 [1920]); Steiner, 
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 Steiner was also an earlier appreciator of Nietzsche and his views share aspects 
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Zeit, which has been translated under the title Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter for 
Freedom (Garber Communications, 1985); Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5. 
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 See Rudolf Steiner and Walter Johannes Stein, Dokumentation eines 
Wegweisenden Zusammenwirkens, ed. Thomas Meyer (Dornach: Philosophisch-
Anthroposophischer Verlag am Goetheanum, 1985), p. 42ff, p. 191ff.  
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 See Steiner‟s discussion of Fichte in his doctoral thesis Truth and Science. 
Rudolf Steiner, Truth and Science, trans. William Lindeman (Spring Valley, NY: 
Mercury Press, 1993 [1892]), p. 42ff; Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3, p. 71ff.  
13
 See, for instance, Rudolf Steiner, Goethe’s World View, trans. William 
Lindeman (Spring Valley, NY: Mercury Press, 1985 [1897]), p. 75ff; Steiner, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 6, p. 101ff.  
14
 See Rudolf Steiner, Knowledge of the Higher Worlds: How is it Achieved?, 
trans. D.S. Osmond and C. Davy (London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1969 [1904]), p. 
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cognitive powers, as well as modern intellectual consciousness, is correlated 
with a distinctive ontological order.
15
  
Modern scientific thought according to Steiner is uniquely adapted to 
grasping the nature of the physical order. As mentioned above, ordinarily we 
are only self-conscious in the moment when the mental activity of thinking 
crystallises or results in determinate thoughts. Another way of putting this is to 
say that conscious awareness lights up in the moment when thinking dies in 
thought, when it makes the transition from a dynamic to a static existence. In 
line with the ancient conception that „like knows like‟ Steiner views such 
thought as uniquely suited to understanding what is dead in nature, namely the 
inorganic or physical realm.
16
 However, through a Goethean approach to 
organic morphology and meditative practices, our thinking can be enlivened 
and eventually experienced in its present activity. Steiner calls this living 
thinking and Imagination.
17
 Goethe already claimed that to understand nature 
“we must remain as quick and flexible as nature” and spoke of the possibility 
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 See Rudolf Steiner, Cosmology, Religion and Philosophy, trans. Harry Collison 
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Press, 1976).  
16
 See Rudolf Steiner, The Origins of Natural Science, trans. Maria St Goar (Spring 
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an intensification of the activity of thinking we can come to an intuitive experience 
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in der Philosophie der Freiheit und der Geheimwissenschaft Rudolf Steiners 
(Stuttgart: Verlag Freies Geistes Leben, 1995), p. 22ff. 
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of “participating spiritually in its [nature‟s] creative processes.”
18
 Living 
thinking or Imagination, in contrast to the ordinary intellect, is especially suited 
to grasping the living processes in nature, and the formative forces (bildende 
Kräfte) or life of nature, what Steiner calls the „etheric world‟.
19
  
Imagination involves thinking in images. The image-character of 
Imagination makes it akin to dreaming. However, whereas dreaming involves a 
diminishing of consciousness, Imagination involves a heightening of 
awareness. Steiner‟s view is very similar to Henry Corbin‟s articulation of the 
creative imagination as a kind of intermediate consciousness that lies between 
the sensible world and the spiritual world. In Imagination, divine realities 
reveal themselves in the form of symbolic images. It is only at the level of 
what Steiner calls Inspiration that these spiritual realities disclose themselves 
in an unmediated fashion. Nevertheless, Imagination is a cognitive organ that 
stands higher than the ordinary intellect.  
Building on the earlier esoteric tradition, Steiner elaborates numerous 
relationships between the microcosm (human being) and the macrocosm 
(universe). His works are filled with explications of connections between: the 
earthly and the heavenly; plants, the planets and metals; the human being and 
nature‟s archetypes, and so on. Such relationships or „correspondences‟ first 
become evident at the level of Imagination. Whereas for the discursive 
intellectual thought that is predominant today, the universe appears to be made 
up of disconnected physical objects, Imagination reveals the universe as 
interwoven with meaningful relationships.  
Antoine Faivre, in his pioneering academic study Access to Western 
Esotericism, outlines a number of features that are central to the esoteric 
tradition including Imagination and „correspondences‟.
20
 Faivre specifies that 
the former is the cognitive organ that perceives the latter. Steiner in these 
respects is a paradigmatic esotericist and his conception of the Imagination 
can, in short, be referred to as the „esoteric Imagination‟.  
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Steiner’s Narrative of the Evolution of Consciousness 
For the present purposes I can only touch on a few key features of Steiner‟s 
vast and complex view of natural and spiritual evolution.
21
 I will briefly 
introduce the notion of the evolution of consciousness and then offer a 
synopsis of Steiner‟s evolutionary narrative. 
In studying the history of ideas we customarily assume that what 
changes historically is not the world itself but the thoughts of human beings 
about the world. The idea of the evolution of consciousness is far more radical, 
in that it sees in pre-history and history a transformation in the very structure 
and character of consciousness, the world, and their interrelationship. The 
history of ideas is thus only the expression of a deeper evolution.
22
  
Steiner‟s concept of the evolution of consciousness provides a 
distinctive hermeneutic angle on the history of ideas.
23
 It offers a deeper 
explanation for why humanity‟s ideas have transformed over time. When 
considering the major shifts in ideas that occur even over just a few millennia 
(or even a few centuries) it is instructive to ask the question: how could ideas 
that appeared self-evident to earlier cultures seem so strange to us today? If 
people‟s consciousness was more or less identical to our own, why were their 
views theocentric or polytheistic, why did they describe reality in mythological 
terms, why did they pursue „sciences‟ such as alchemy and astrology? The 
concept of an evolution of consciousness makes sense of earlier „worldviews‟ 
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 See Rudolf Steiner, An Outline of Esoteric Science, trans. Henry B. Monges 
(Great Barrington, MA: Anthroposophic Press, 1997 [1910]), p. 117ff; Steiner, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 13, p. 137ff.  
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 See Rudolf Steiner, The Riddles of Philosophy, introduction by Fritz Koelln 
(Spring Valley, NY: Anthroposophic Press, 1973 [1914]); Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, 
vol. 18. 
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 Although the conventional approach to intellectual history is not informed by the 
notion of the evolution of consciousness, there are a number of scholars from 
various disciplines whose approach to the history of ideas bears a close affinity in 
certain respects to Steiner‟s view, even if they do not use the expression „the 
evolution of consciousness‟. See, for instance, Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the 
Mind: in Greek Philosophy and Literature, trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1982); Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: 
Vol. III: The Phenomenology of Knowledge, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1957); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, trans. 
Lilian A. Clare (London: Allen and Unwin, 1923); Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 
trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1992 [1942/1943]).  
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through interpreting them as the expression of a consciousness that was 
qualitatively different from contemporary consciousness.
24
 
We find a similar transformation in the mind-world relation in the 
development of our own consciousness from childhood into adulthood. The 
difference between the consciousness of the child and the adult has been a 
recurring theme in poetry since the Romantic era (perhaps the most famous 
example is Wordsworth‟s ode, „Intimations of Immortality from Recollections 
of Early Childhood‟); countless poets have drawn attention to the childhood 
sense of oneness with the world which is gradually lost in the process of 
maturation. Steiner and Barfield, moreover, regarded the development of the 
individual psyche as a kind of recapitulation of the evolution of consciousness; 
they applied the well-known evolutionary idea that ontogenesis follows 
phylogenesis to the development of consciousness.
25
  
In order to give a specific example of how an understanding of the 
evolution of consciousness differs from the customary approach to the history 
of ideas we can consider the prevalence of astrology in earlier cultures (of 
course, astrology in a superficial and derivative form is still popular today but 
this does not explain its original significance).
26
 From a conventional 
perspective on the history of ideas (one that is not informed by the view of an 
evolution of consciousness) it seems that earlier cultures simply speculated that 
spiritual influences proceed from the firmament. To approach the same matter 
from the view of the evolution of consciousness is to assume that (or at least 
question whether) the very phenomena of the stars and planets were 
experienced differently in the past. People had a qualitative experience of what 
today has become a realm of merely mechanical relationships; they actually felt 
that the firmament was a source of distinctive spiritual, psychological and 
formative influences on the earth. Astrology thus appears not as a fanciful 
speculation lacking any reason; rather the views of astrology were supported 
by an experience of the world that was qualitatively different from our own. 
This same approach can be applied to the development of all aspects of history 
and culture. The theocentricity of earlier cultures, for instance, can thus be 
explained as being grounded in a genuine experience of the proximity of the 
divine – the experience of the world as theophany – which no longer holds for 
                                                     
24
 See Steiner, The Riddles of Philosophy; Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 18. 
25
 See, for instance, Rudolf Steiner, The Kingdom of Childhood, trans. Helen Fox 
(London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1974 [1924]); Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 311; 
and Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction, A Study in Meaning (Middletown, CT: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1973 [1928]), p. 82ff.  
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 See Owen Barfield, Saving the Appearances (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1988 [1957]), p. 76ff. 
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our common experience. It is precisely such an approach that informs Steiner‟s 
entire view of evolution, history and the future. 
Earlier we mentioned Steiner‟s view that the ordinary intellect is 
uniquely suited to grasping the physical order; the beginnings of this 
consciousness can be more or less identified with the birth of the modern 
scientific revolution. Steiner identifies the rise of rationality in a much broader 
sense with the emergence of philosophy out of a mythological worldview in 
the Pre-Socratics.
27
 In Steiner‟s general picture we find that the further we go 
back in time the more expansive and less individual consciousness appears. In 
the past, human consciousness experienced itself as participating in a divine 
intelligence and world, and was more communal than individual. If we follow 
the evolution of consciousness in reverse order – from the present to the distant 
past – we find that consciousness gradually moves from a more conscious 
rational form to a semi-conscious equivalent of Imagination, Inspiration, and 
finally, Intuition.
28
 Thus mythology is an expression of a kind of pre-individual 
Imagination. The birth of a more independent rational consciousness begins 
with the ancient Greeks but this does not mean that the Greeks suddenly lost all 
sense of participation in a greater reality.
29
 A more decisive emergence of 
individualised self-consciousness begins with the renaissance and the modern 
scientific revolution, and it is with modern physicalism and scientism that all 
sense of participation in reality is finally expunged.  
According to Steiner the great significance of philosophy and, even 
more so, of modern scientific thought, is the way they have assisted in the 
emergence of self-consciousness. Modern science has established a view of the 
world devoid of anything animate or spiritual. Thus it creates a strong sense of 
opposition between I and not-I, subject and object, self and world.
30
 Modern 
science estranges us from the cosmos, but thereby increases a sense of separate 
self-identity. Thus, paradoxically, materialistic science enhances our 
awareness of self. However, the self that exists through this opposition is only 
an immature form of self-consciousness. The task of the future is to self-
consciously regain the breadth of ancient consciousness. The evolution of 
consciousness is a descent from a state of unconscious participation in the 
                                                     
27
 See Rudolf Steiner, The Riddles of Philosophy, p. 12ff; Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, 
vol. 18, p. 35ff.  
28
 See, for instance, Steiner, Cosmology, Religion and Philosophy; Steiner, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 215. 
29
 See Steiner, The Riddles of Philosophy, p. 12ff; Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 18, 
p. 35ff.  
30
 See, for instance, Steiner, The Origins of Natural Science; Steiner, 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 326. 
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divine that gradually leads to greater self-consciousness and implication in the 
physical world and potentially, in the future, will lead to a self-conscious „re-
ascent‟ and participation.
31
 The first stage in the further transformation of our 
cognitive capacities is Imagination (self-conscious Imagination).  
Steiner‟s „grand narrative‟ of the evolution of consciousness shares 
some features in common with Hegel‟s philosophy of history and other 
features in common with Heidegger‟s „history of Being‟, but also includes 
many unique aspects.
32
 The evolution of consciousness involves both loss and 
progress. There has been a loss in our awareness of greater natural and spiritual 
realities but a progress in the development of self-consciousness. From an 
anthroposophical point of view one could say that Heidegger was right to see 
modern consciousness as impoverished in contrast to the ancient Greeks, and 
was even to some extent justified in his identification of significant problems 
with the modern self. However, his critique of the self is in certain respects 
one-sided as he fails to see the progressive aspects in the development of self-
consciousness and its potential for maturation. Further, his emphasis on the 
ancient Greeks (coupled with his critique of the self) at times inclines towards 
the regressive. Hegel, in contrast, while placing the development of self-
consciousness at the centre of his view of history, did not see any loss in this 
development and had little to say about the future. According to Steiner the 
task of the future is for individuals to regain, in a new and conscious way, the 
breadth of ancient consciousness. Having sketched Steiner‟s view of 
Imagination and the evolution of consciousness in bare outlines, we can now 
turn to the thought of Barfield. 
 
Barfield on Poetic Imagination 
Owen Barfield‟s seminal work for our theme, Poetic Diction, began as his 
Bachelor of Letters thesis at Oxford University. Following his encounter with 
Steiner‟s thought in the early 1920s, Barfield continued to work on the 
manuscript, which was published in 1928. Barfield tells us that two 
experiences laid the foundation for this book. Firstly, in his early twenties he 
                                                     
31
 Steiner‟s Christology plays a central role in his view of the evolution of 
consciousness but there is not sufficient space to discuss this here. For an 
introduction to his Christology see Rudolf Steiner, Christianity as Mystical Fact, 
trans. Andrew Welburn (Great Barrington, MA: Steiner Books, 2006 [1902]); 
Steiner, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 8. 
32
 See, for instance, G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Martin 
Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973). 
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experienced an intensified appreciation of certain passages of lyric poetry, in 
particular the poetry of British Romanticism. He noticed a “felt change of 
consciousness,” which involved an enhancement of the meaning of individual 
words through their poetic combination, and a correlative transformation of the 
way he perceived nature, history, and art.
33
 This experience led him to the 
conviction that poetic imagination was not a matter of mere fantasy, but the 
source of meaning and a faculty of cognitive insight. Secondly, through the 
study of philology, in particular the semantic history of words, he was also 
beginning to formulate the idea of an evolution of consciousness without any 
awareness of Steiner. Barfield subsequently discovered in Steiner a closely-
related but far more developed approach to the evolution of consciousness and 
imagination. He states that “my most daring and (as I thought) original 
conclusions were his premises” and “anthroposophy included and transcended 
not only my poor stammering theory of poetry as knowledge, but the whole 
Romantic philosophy. It was nothing less than Romanticism grown up.”
34
 
Barfield devoted much time to developing a theory of the poetic 
imagination, to an interpretation of the semantic shifts in languages as an 
expression of the evolution of consciousness,
35
 and to an exegesis of British 
Romanticism in relation to anthroposophical ideas. While Steiner presents his 
ideas as a further evolution of German Romanticism and idealism, Barfield 
illustrates this continuity with regard to British Romanticism.
36
 One 
particularly relevant example is the close connection between Coleridge and 
Steiner‟s view of imagination (they share, for instance, an identification of 
imagination with the living and with the understanding of symbols). There is a 
significant amount of recent research that demonstrates the relationship 
between Romanticism and the Western esoteric tradition, and this implies 
another important affinity between Romanticism and Anthroposophy.
37
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 Owen Barfield, Romanticism Comes of Age (London: Anthroposophical 
Publishing Company, 1944), pp. 5-6.  
34
 Barfield, Romanticism Comes of Age, pp. 8-9. 
35
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In the first instance, for Barfield, the poetic imagination is essentially 
the mind in its mode of creative discovery, and its operation is not limited to 
the sphere of poetry, but is responsible for the emergence of unprecedented 
insights in all disciplines. Barfield devoted most attention to demonstrating the 
evidence for this operation of the poetic imagination through a consideration of 
language.  
The work of poetic imagination in relation to language can be traced 
through considering cases where one can identify that a word or phrase has 
been granted new meaning. One of the main ways in which this semantic 
development is achieved is through the use of metaphor, which Barfield 
conceives as a suggestion of the unknown by means of the known.
38
 It is now 
fairly common knowledge in the academic literature that the meanings of many 
words in poetry, science, philosophy, and other realms of discourse, have their 
origin in metaphorical usage.
39
 Thus metaphor, which at one time was regarded 
as a special feature of poetry, is now widely perceived as a general source of 
new meaning and of the polysemy of words.  
In order to see the way in which the use of metaphor introduces new 
meaning into language we need to consider the senses of a word prior to its 
acquisition of an additional meaning and the way in which this new meaning 
emerges. Thus, the word „gravity‟ prior to Isaac Newton meant „weight‟. In 
order to articulate his scientific discovery, Newton used the word „gravity‟ as a 
metaphor; he thus was able to suggest the previously unknown concept of 
gravity by means of the already known meaning of „weight‟.
40
 In conceiving 
gravity Newton came to an unprecedented insight, and in using the metaphor 
he stimulates his readers to make the poetic discovery of this new meaning. 
Barfield gives other examples such as „focus‟ and „point of view‟. Prior to 
Johannes Kepler „focus‟ meant „hearth‟ and Kepler used it as a metaphor to 
suggest „focus‟ in the geometrical sense.
41
 Prior to Coleridge‟s time the 
expression „point of view‟ meant one‟s point of view when looking at a 
landscape, and “Coleridge or somebody else either said or thought... „x is to the 
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mind what point of view is to an observer of a landscape‟. And in so doing he 
enriched the content of the expression „point of view.‟”
42
 The same process and 
enrichment of meaning can be shown for numerous philosophical and scientific 
terms. This creative employment of language does not stick with the already 
given meanings of words but rather mediates the emergence of new meaning 
through suggesting a metaphorical resemblance between an existing sense and 
the as yet unnamed. Barfield‟s understanding of the mental process involved in 
this genesis of meaning can be paraphrased in the following way.
43
 Firstly, 
through the activity of the poetic mind or imagination, the poet, scientist, or 
philosopher thinks a new meaning. Secondly, the meaning of an already known 
word or phrase is used as a metaphor to suggest the new meaning. The reader 
approaches the situation from the other direction. The reader confronts a 
linguistic usage that does not make sense literally, and thereby recognises that 
a word is being used metaphorically. Through a poetic act of interpreting the 
metaphor the reader then lights on the new meaning. In this way the collective 
meaning of words and language is enriched and transformed (even if the 
additional meaning does not become an enduring sense of the word or phrase).  
While the poetic imagination is operative in all disciplines, poetry in the 
more limited sense is arguably the place in which language is most creatively 
employed in order to generate new meaning. In the case of English, the 
example of Shakespeare suffices to illustrate the profound way in which poetic 
language can increase and transform the meanings of a language, as 
Shakespeare was the author of numerous meanings and words that are central 
to academic disciplines as well as everyday parlance.
44
 In this function, poetry 
literally fulfils its etymological sense of making (poiesis) meaning and Barfield 
conceives one of the fundamental tasks of poetry to be the maintenance of the 
vitality of a language. Poetry is language in a state of becoming and 
transformation, rather than language that is fixed and dead; language as cliché 
and so on.  
Barfield‟s view of imagination, metaphor and new meaning bears a clear 
resemblance to Heidegger‟s view of poetry as the “founding of being in the 
word,” in that poetry is a naming which first makes known (at the very least in 
the sense of the collective knowledge of a linguistic community) the very 
phenomenon which it names.
45
 From what has been said it should also be clear 
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that Barfield‟s view of poetic imagination is related to Steiner‟s understanding 
of thinking. Most poets (as well as philosophers and scientists when they come 
to new insights) acknowledge that there is something mysterious and 
unconscious at work in the creative act. Creative activity cannot be grasped or 
determined in an entirely reflective manner. Barfield thinks of the poetic 
imagination as operating above the threshold of consciousness and relates this 
in a number of places to Steiner‟s view of thinking (in contrast to thought). 
However, before elaborating these connections we should consider language 
(and the mind) in its polar state from the poetic.  
Through customary usage the meanings of words contract and the living 
metaphors become dead metaphors and literal meanings.
46
 In our habitual 
relationship to language we treat the senses of words as relatively fixed and 
unchanging properties and we give little or no thought to the origin of 
meanings. In daily parlance we do not reflect on the original metaphoricity of 
an expression such as „I grasp what you mean‟, nor do we have any idea that 
“our feelings are... Shakespeare‟s „meaning‟.”
47
  
This rigid relationship to linguistic meaning is for Barfield not only 
characteristic of everyday discourse, it is also the case for the mind in its 
logical operation. According to Barfield the logical or rational function of the 
mind enables a reflective self-consciousness but is unable to create fresh 
meaning.
48
 The rational is reflective and formal, rather than being the creative 
originator of new content. The purest expression of this mode of the mind is 
symbolic logic with its entirely formal status. Nevertheless, Barfield does not 
value one operation of the mind in total exclusion from the other (were this to 
be possible). He is of the view that a poetic mind without the rational function 
would be creative but entirely unconscious, whereas the rational mind without 
the creative function would be self-conscious but lack all content. Barfield 
projects the goal of a higher marriage of the creative and the reflective such 
that ultimately one could be self-conscious and creative at the same time.
49
 
There is therefore an obvious parallel between Steiner‟s view of 
thinking as an ordinarily unobserved, spiritual activity that only becomes self-
conscious in the moment when the thinking process is arrested in determinate 
thoughts, and Barfield‟s view of the poetic imagination and poetic language 
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(new metaphors, for instance) in contrast to the logical mind and static 
language. The poetic imagination in this sense is a kind of living thinking and 
poetic language could be called living language in contrast to dead language, or 
even original language in contrast to derivative language. In the essay „Speech, 
Reason and Imagination‟ in Romanticism Comes of Age, Barfield elaborates 
this idea in the following way: 
As users of language, the poet and the logician stand at opposite 
poles. To the logician the sound of a word means nothing at all, 
while to the poet it is of utmost importance. To the logician those 
words are of most value which change their meaning as little as 
possible, when they are used in different contexts; the poet likes 
meanings which change most, and is always trying to change them 
further himself. The logician tries for statement, the poet for 
suggestion. And so we could go on. But the object of this digression 
was to point out that, while this other kind of thinking [namely living 
thinking in Steiner‟s sense] is certainly not expressible in words 
taken in the first sense... it has a very close connection indeed with 
words taken in the second sense... there we should listen for its 
voice.
50
  
While some of the ideas about metaphor and language that have thus far 
been discussed are quite well-known in the literature today, Barfield‟s 
perspective has more philosophical depth than the majority of writers on this 
theme, in that he does not approach metaphor and meaning as a specialised 
area of study but rather integrates various disciplines in a way that is informed 
by a philosophical conception of the nature of thinking, language, meaning and 
world. Poetic imagination, for Barfield, is a kind of living thinking that 
facilitates the emergence of new meaning in language. As a source of meaning 
it is essential to meaningfulness as such, and to the maintenance of the vitality 
of a language. We will now consider another aspect of Barfield‟s view of 
metaphor, an aspect that is informed by his understanding of the evolution of 
consciousness.  
While metaphor is a major source of lexical polysemy and new 
meanings, metaphor also presupposes existent meanings, which it employs in 
strange and unprecedented ways. For this reason metaphor cannot be the origin 
of all meaning in language. Due to this fact many authors on the subject of 
metaphor argue that the earliest words had a purely literal meaning and these 
words were only later employed in a metaphorical sense. Moreover, „literal‟ is 
often thought to be synonymous with „physical‟ or „material‟. Thus, so the 
story goes, physical or literal meanings are the oldest; these meanings are later 
applied in a metaphorical sense and immaterial (psychological, spiritual, 
                                                     
50
 Barfield, Romanticism Comes of Age, pp. 61-62. 
Owen Barfield and Rudolf Steiner 
Literature & Aesthetics 21 (1) June 2011, page 150 
abstract, and so on) meanings are thereby introduced into language. Barfield, in 
contrast, believes that this view is partially true when it comes to the origin of 
many modern meanings but is totally opposed to the view that the original 
meanings of words were literal or material.
51
  
An exclusively physical or literal view of the universe is only a recent 
development in the evolution of consciousness. When we look at the historical 
and philological evidence we find that the further we travel back in time, the 
more religious and mythological worldviews appear, and there is no evidence 
of a time when human beings perceived the world in purely physical terms. 
According to Barfield, the view that primordial human beings saw the world in 
entirely physical terms is nothing more than an anachronistic projection of 
modern and contemporary consciousness on the distant past.
52
 
An example of this anachronistic view would be to claim that primeval 
humanity first perceived light as a purely physical phenomenon, and at a later 
date human beings employed this material sense of light as a metaphor and 
thereby established the idiom connected to „the light of the mind‟.
53
 In contrast, 
Barfield argues that older meanings give evidence of a consciousness that had 
not yet separated the material from the spiritual. Rather than ancient meanings 
being physical, Barfield insists that the study of language suggests that they 
were pre-dualistic, that the rigid opposition between inner and outer is a much 
later development in consciousness.
54
 In this respect, one of his most striking 
discussions is of the Greek word pneuma, and its Latin equivalent spiritus. The 
ancient Greek word pneuma and the Latin spiritus can be translated as „breath‟, 
„wind‟ or „spirit‟. Barfield criticises the views of Max Müller who held that 
first the literal meaning of wind or breath must have existed and this was later 
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employed metaphorically to mean „spirit‟ or “the principle of life within man 
or animal.”
55
 In Poetic Diction Barfield responds as follows: 
such an hypothesis is contrary to every indication provided by the 
study of the history of meaning; which assures us definitely that such 
a purely material content as „wind‟, on the one hand, and on the 
other, such a purely abstract content as „the principle of life within 
man or animal‟ are both late arrivals in human consciousness… We 
must… imagine a time when „spiritus‟ or πνεûμα, or older words 
from which these had descended, meant neither breath, nor wind, nor 
spirit, nor yet all three of these things, but when they simply had 
their own old peculiar meaning, which has since, in the course of the 
evolution of consciousness, crystallized into the three meanings 
specified.
56
 
In other words pneuma points to a distinctive meaning in which the 
outer reality of wind and the inner reality of spirit were not yet divided.
57
 
According to Barfield the evidence suggests that early meanings were neither 
literal nor metaphorical but prior to such a distinction. He sometimes uses the 
word „figurative‟ to distinguish ancient meanings from metaphor and literal 
meaning, and characterises his sense of figurative as follows: “We look back 
and we find concomitant meanings…; we find an inner meaning transpiring or 
showing some way through the outer.”
58
  
Another way of putting this is to say that for ancient consciousness the 
world was „symbolic‟ but not in the sense that brute objects were attributed a 
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symbolic significance; rather the things themselves naturally had a symbolic 
meaning; they were symbolic. However, one need not go that far back in time 
to discover meanings that retain something of a pre-dualistic or figurative 
character. In medieval physiology, for instance, we find that the body‟s internal 
organs and fluids were associated with distinctive emotions.
59
 Thus we have 
the word „choleric‟, and the French have „en colère‟, meaning to be angry; 
„choler‟ etymologically has the meaning of „bile‟, which was associated with 
anger in medieval medicine. Or we can turn to the numerous words of 
astrological provenance that suggest an intrinsic relationship between the inner 
and outer, such as „saturnine‟ and „jovial‟. We can even find contemporary 
instances that still reveal a partial connection between inner and outer, such as 
the sense of the word „heart‟ as an emotional centre.
60
 While the emotional 
sense of „heart‟ plays no role in conventional modern medicine, I think it is 
wrong to see this sense as merely metaphorical. Even if science inclines us to 
think that we feel with our brains, if we turn to our experiences, most of us, I 
assume, will find that our feelings have their centre in the physiological 
location of the heart. Thus, there is no shortage of examples of meanings where 
the inner and the outer are closely intertwined and not yet entirely divided and 
one can easily picture how in the course of the evolution of consciousness 
unified meanings gradually separated.  
According to Barfield it is with the development of the discursive, 
intellectual mind that a division or “„polarization‟ of an ancient unity into an 
outer and an inner meaning” occurs.
61
 Thus figurative meaning is earlier than 
literal meaning and human consciousness gradually divides the figurative into 
the separated senses of the inner and the outer. The evolution of consciousness 
is a process of de-animating the world and dividing the mind and nature. It is 
only after this division occurs that purely physical meanings exist and these 
can be applied metaphorically to suggest the immaterial. Therefore, it is only in 
recent times that the common theory of the relation between the literal and the 
metaphorical truly applies. Before elaborating other aspects of Barfield‟s view 
of metaphor, more needs to be said about his conception of the evolution of 
consciousness.  
Above I mentioned that for ancient consciousness things were symbolic. 
In Saving the Appearances Barfield draws on the anthropological writings of 
Levy-Bruhl and refers to ancient consciousness as one of “original 
participation” and defines participation as an “extra-sensory link between the 
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percipient and the representations.”
62
 „Original participation‟ for Barfield is not 
something that arose through a special conscious act, rather ancient humanity 
naturally participated in the cosmos. Thinking and perceiving were not yet 
experienced as possessions of the individual mind, but as divinely granted, and 
human beings experienced themselves as incorporated into a larger reality. Just 
as a child‟s earlier development occurs more or less unconsciously, so human 
development in its earlier stages was not a wholly conscious achievement.  
There is a great deal of philological evidence for this view. For our 
present purposes we can refer to the changing meaning of poetic „inspiration‟. 
While ancient poets referred to inspiration as a state in which a god took 
possession of the poet‟s mind – thus the Odyssey begins with “Sing to me, O 
Muse,” and the poet‟s task is to channel the inspiration of the Muse (and 
„Muse‟ at this point in time did not have a metaphorical meaning) – for modern 
poets inspiration assumes a relatively minor role. Whatever the precise role 
that a modern poet attributes to inspiration, the writing of poetry is largely a 
matter of individual effort.
63
 While this example applies specifically to the 
poet, Barfield‟s view is that the general consciousness in the past had a more 
participative and less individual character than modern consciousness.
64
 The 
evolution of consciousness leads to an increasing autonomy of human thought 
and self-consciousness and a correlative disenchantment of the world, such that 
the world becomes a merely outer world in contradistinction to an enclosed 
inner life. In a very real sense, Barfield views this as a process in which the 
spirit withdraws from nature into the human interior. However, in this divided 
consciousness, Barfield identifies a deeper task of the poetic imagination and 
metaphor, which he names “final participation.”
65
 
Final participation relates to what Barfield in Poetic Diction calls a “felt 
change of consciousness,” which occurs in the shift from a prosaic to a poetic 
state of mind. Whereas prosaic consciousness regards the world as a universe 
of brute and detached physical objects, poetic metaphors and symbols enable a 
meaningful re-animation of appearances. This poetic consciousness, moreover, 
bears an affinity to original participation but with important differences. If 
original participation involved a unity, which we call „a‟, then in the course of 
the evolution of consciousness „a‟ divides into „x‟ (exterior) and „y‟ (interior). 
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What a poetic metaphor, symbol, or „objective correlative‟ achieves is a 
synthesis of „x‟ and „y‟, which in a metaphor assumes the form „x is y‟. Thus 
the poetic metaphor reconciles what has been divided, it achieves a meaningful 
translucence of the inner through the outer. To offer an example, we can turn to 
the line from T. S. Eliot‟s „The Hollow Men‟, which suggests that the hollow 
heads of the hollow and “stuffed men” are a “Headpiece filled with straw.” 
While the theme or tenor of the poem is the „hollow men‟ (which is already 
metaphorical) we also perceive the vehicle of the metaphor, the „straw‟, in a 
different light through these lines.
66
 The straw suggests a quality of mental 
vacuity, which is translucent in the „objective correlative‟. Numerous and 
varied examples could serve to illustrate how poetry grants „outer‟ phenomena 
an inner meaning. Thus, there is a resemblance between ancient figurative 
language and modern poetic language but there are also significant differences. 
Firstly, poetic language reconciles the inner and the outer but it does not 
completely identify them. Secondly, this synthesis presupposes that a division 
has occurred. Thirdly, these meanings are not given but are achieved through 
an imaginative act of the individual mind. This third point requires further 
elaboration. 
Above we distinguished ancient inspiration from the situation of the 
modern poet. It is instructive to contrast, as Barfield suggests, the invocation 
“Sing to me, O Muse” with these lines from Coleridge‟s „Dejection: An Ode‟: 
“O Lady! We receive but what we give,/ And in our life alone does nature 
live.”
67
 Coleridge‟s poem encapsulates the position of the modern poetic 
imagination. Whereas for the ancient mind meaning was bestowed by nature 
and the divine, the modern poet is a creator of meaning, and a creator or at 
least co-creator in the deep sense of the word. Thus the synthesis of inner and 
outer achieved by the modern poetic imagination is intimately connected to the 
free and creative activity of the individual. This situation of the modern poet is 
deeply connected to the evolution of consciousness. For Barfield, at the present 
point in evolution the human being has emerged from the status of a creature 
and is stepping into the role of a kind of creator. Barfield interprets Coleridge‟s 
statement about imagination being “the repetition in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation” in these evolutionary terms.
68
 In Saving the 
Appearances he elaborates this point in speaking of the analogy between 
original participation and final participation. He states, 
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[t]here is a valid analogy if, but only if, we admit that, in the course 
of the earth‟s history, something like a Divine Word has been 
gradually clothing itself with the humanity it first gradually created – 
so that what was first spoken by God may eventually be respoken by 
man.
69
 
Thus the „Divine Word‟ has gradually united with the individual human 
being and final participation is a kind of creative restoration of an original 
unity that has been divided, a creative giving back (“we receive but what we 
give”) to nature of what we have taken from nature; its creative principle. The 
statement that the human being is stepping into the role of a kind of creator 
could be misinterpreted as a hubristic conception. However, Barfield‟s (and 
Steiner‟s) view is subtle and complex and involves a genuine paradox, namely, 
that inspiration now requires that the individual mind be in an active state and 
in this state the individual can be both free and inspired. Thus, inspiration 
cannot be merely willed (this would be hubris), but it does depend on the active 
involvement of the individual. While this sounds paradoxical and perhaps is 
paradoxical, I think that it reveals the authentic character of modern artistic 
experience.
70
 
The final aspect of the poetic imagination that I would like to discuss 
concerns the relationship between metaphor and esoteric „correspondences‟. 
The doctrine of correspondences relates to what has already been stated about 
the synthesis of the inner and the outer, as correspondences include intrinsic 
relationships between the psychological and the spiritual on the one hand and 
the material world on the other. Barfield, moreover, implicitly relates his 
conception of final participation to the esoteric idea of the correspondence 
between the microcosm (human being) and the macrocosm (universe). He 
asserts that, “[h]enceforth, if nature is to be experienced as representation, she 
will be experienced as representation of – Man.”
71
 By this Barfield is not 
making a solipsistic point about human consciousness being confined to its 
own representations. Rather he is implying that nature itself is the 
macroanthropos; however, in contrast to earlier esoteric views this must be 
understood in relation to the evolution of consciousness. The Divine Word that 
has been at work in the evolution of nature and the human being has become 
intimately associated with the free activity of the individual mind. If art and 
poetry are created out of genuine imagination then the same spirit, so to speak, 
that created nature will be manifest in the works of art, and this art will 
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represent „Man‟ or the „higher self‟ rather than the finite personality. 
Furthermore, final participation in so far as it is achieved through the poetic 
imagination requires true syntheses or correspondences of the interior and the 
exterior. This view places a high demand on the future of poetry. Poetry, 
according to Barfield, has been and can be concerned with merely personal 
self-expression and symbolisms. However, poetry of this sort does not 
facilitate the imaginative reconciliation of final participation, rather it brings 
about the very opposite, a reinforcement of the alienated subjectivity that it is 
the task of the future to transcend.
72
  
We have focused primarily on the role of metaphor as a reconciliation of 
the inner and outer; however, a metaphor can draw connections between 
objects of any kind. Some metaphors draw more superficial connections 
between things, but there also exist deeper metaphors or what Barfield calls 
“true metaphors:”  
Men do not invent those mysterious relations between separate 
external objects, and between objects and feelings or ideas, which it 
is the function of poetry to reveal... The language of primitive men 
reports them as direct perceptual experience. The speaker has 
observed a unity, and is not therefore himself conscious of relation. 
But we, in the development of consciousness, have lost the power to 
see this one as one... now it is the language of poets, in so far as they 
create true metaphors, which must restore this unity conceptually, 
after it has been lost from perception... imagination can see them [the 
relationships] again.
73
 
It seems to me that Barfield‟s „true metaphors‟ are nothing less than 
„correspondences‟ as understood by Steiner and the broader esoteric tradition.
74
 
When Paracelsus, for instance, claims that iron is mars, the statement has the 
character of a metaphor („a is b‟) in that two objects normally treated as 
separate are identified.
75
 Conversely, when Judith Wright calls the wattle 
blossoms “a million images of the Sun,” and concludes the poem with “… the 
Sun, my God,” perhaps she is not revealing unprecedented resemblances or 
making a merely emotive statement, but rather surmising in a new way 
connections between the astronomical and the plant realm, the sun and the 
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divine, that were a given for the ancient mind.
76
 The opening of Pattiann 
Rogers‟ poem „Alpha and Omega‟ offers a related example: “Three blackbirds 
tear at carrion/ in a ditch, and all the light/ of the stars is there too, present in 
their calls, embodied in their ebony beaks.”
77
 
 
Conclusion  
In his writings, Barfield develops Steiner‟s ideas about Imagination and the 
evolution of consciousness in relation to semantic history and the poetic 
imagination. The esoteric view of Imagination that is found in Steiner, and the 
way in which Barfield elaborates this view, offer a far deeper foundation and 
significance to poetry than is common today. The poetic imagination at its 
most profound is an organ of truth that creatively discloses integral 
relationships between things, and I would add that even if poetry does not 
always or even often reveal esoteric correspondences, in so far as it is 
metaphorical and seeks out resemblances between phenomena, it approaches 
Imagination in this deeper sense. If the world is a tapestry whose threads have 
been unravelled by science and the operation of the discursive mind, poetry 
weaves these threads back together into a meaningful image. Or as Barfield 
puts it in Poetic Diction, “[t]he world, like Dionysus, is torn to pieces by pure 
intellect; but the poet is Zeus; he has swallowed the heart of the world; and he 
can reproduce it as a living body.”
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